Abstract: Vacant housing and even housing demolition have recently become an issue in a number of countries. Given this renewed interest in demolition, this paper contributes to the literatures on (i) housing demolition and (ii) policy coordination. The paper extends Sweeney (1974a)'s analysis of demolition and filtering, by letting households also choose their location. Then when demolishing part of its housing stock, a city effectively evicts some of its residents not just out of the housing quality it demolishes but out of every other of its qualities, too. The paper shows that demolition's coordination strengthens local governments' incentive to demolish part of their stock, by shutting down inter city migration within qualities. -A case study on Germany's East illustrates the effects of coordinated, simultaneous every-city demolition.
Introduction
Vacant housing has become an issue in a number of countries today. Following the recent real estate bust, a substantial fraction of US, Irish and Spanish housing is vacant today. Similarly, if for a very different reason, more than one tenth of East Germany's housing has long been vacant, following reunification. Unsurprisingly, the proposal of demolishing vacant housing has surfaced in each of these markets. In fact, Germany has even gone as far as levelling some 250,000 flats in her East since 2002, with another 220,000 flats due to follow over the next four years. Yet demolition is also debated in the US (e.g., Glaeser/Gyourko (2008) ) and in Ireland (e.g., Irish Independent (2011) ).
Given this renewed interest in demolition, this paper contributes to the literatures on housing demolition and policy coordination. On the one hand, the paper extends the analysis of demolition introduced in Sweeney (1974) , and subsequently developed in the filtering literature following it, in three ways. First, in this paper demolition proceeds in a context where households choose not just the quality of their housing but that housing's lot size and spatial location, too. Moreover and second, demolition is no longer restricted to a single city here but may instead simultaneously unfold in many cities, or in even every city. Finally, and as a third innovation with respect to the Sweeney type literature, this paper submits the filtering encountered in models of multiple housing qualities to the objectives and policies of landlord run governments.
On the other hand, the paper also adds to the local public finance literature on local governments' policies, by introducing a variety of different housing qualities into the local jurisdiction framework. With residents mobile across space, any given city's attempt to improve its overall rental income creates fiscal externalities. The paper offers a novel analysis of how such externalities, and the benefits from centralizing decision making (Oates (2011) ), operate in the presence of multiple housing qualities and demolition. Empirically, interpreting the large scale demolition programs long underway (Germany) or currently discussed (in the US, Ireland, and Spain) may serve as a particularly striking and relevant illustration of real world policy coordination. Now, why would countries demolish their vacant housing anyway, rather than watching prices and rents fall, say? Certainly in the US, Ireland and Spain often vacant structures are very modern, having been put up only recently. Nor is East Germany's vacant housing of the worst quality. Intriguing and important as this question may be, in this paper we largely bypass it. We simply assume that local governments are governed by landlords who want to raise -or at least sustaintotal local rents. A detailed analysis of the politics underlying various demolition policies -with homevoters' role in these politics on center stage -can be found in Dascher (2012) .
Instead this paper focuses on how landlord-ruled cities may best sustain, or even raise, their rental incomes if individuals make simultaneous decisions on housing quality, floor space, and residential location. The paper's model permits us to trace filtering across housing qualities, migration across cities, and rental revenues across governments. In permitting simultaneous filtering and migration, this model puts us in the position to analyze the dilemma a single city faces when pondering demolition.
A single city may demolish some of the stock in its lowest quality segment on its own, without other cities going along. Let us suppose that the city targets vacant housing but out of necessity also needs to demolish some occupied housing. (Buildings rarely are completely vacant.) Then it is certainly true that such demolition will raise rents across all of that city's qualities. On the other hand, this attendant increase in rents will drive residents not only out of the segment about to be demolished but out of every better segment, too. Here coordination, by making cities agree to demolish simultaneously, shuts down the avenue of inter city flight.
We append a case study on Germany's East, to illustrate the paper's concepts. Germany's federal government has introduced new legal instruments, facilitating tenants' eviction from housing earmarked for demolition as well as facilitating the rezoning of residential land. But the federal government also directly subsidizes demolition. In response to these incentives, every second resident now lives in a city which has witnessed at least some demolition (BMVBS (2006) ).
Moreover, and second, the case study shows that demolition is not simply meant to dispense with vacant, unwanted housing. If demolition were merely about tearing down flats nobody wants then nobody would miss the flats torn down and hence rents could never rise. Yet in the context of a large data micro data set on rental housing across Germany's regions we find that East Germany's rent, far from keeping in line with West Germany's, rises during the period of ongoing demolition. We interpret this as preliminary evidence that demolition is indeed meant to sustain rent in the face of excess supply.
We briefly review this paper's relationship with the literature on demolition and filtering. Sweeney (1974a) , and then Ohls (1975) , Braid (1981) , Braid (1984) , Kaneko (2006) and Ito (2007) all discuss households' housing quality choice, too, assuming varying combinations of preference and income heterogeneity. However, these papers neither allow for spatial competition between cities, nor do they allow for households' endogenous choice of floor space. Both Arnott/Davidson/Pines (1986) as well as Arnott/Braid/Davidson/Pines (1999) do consider models where households may choose housing quality and quantity, and where residents also pick their location within the urban area. Yet in their papers, too, is analysis restricted to a single city only.
To the best of the author's knowledge, local demolition efforts do not feature in the public finance literature on policy centralization. Starting with Oates (2011) , this literature has focused on issues such as the coordination of taxation in a framework of increasing capital mobility (Zodrow/Mieszkowski (1986) ), or as the coordination of fiscal policies in a framework of growing international trade. Yet of course demolition in one city generates much the same type of positive externalities in neighboring cities as does, say, an increase in government expenditures. Cooper/John (1988) offer one systematic treatment of policy coordination in the presence of externalities. The paper's layout is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, section 3 has the case study, section 4 offers conclusions and section 5 gives the appendix for proposition proofs, respectively.
Model
The model is laid out in three subsections. Subsection 2.1 gives the basic setup. Subsection 2.2 explains how local policies affect households' simultaneous location and quality choices. And subsection 2.3 analyzes the role of federal coordination of local policies.
Basic Assumptions
We introduce a filtering model that incorporates both migration across cities and mobility between housing qualities. Let every city supply a range of i = 1 , . . . , I different qualities of housing. Cities are small, open, and indexed by j = 1 , . . . , J, where J is a large number. A pair (i, j) indicates a housing segment's quality and location. The number of those living in city j's segment i is n j i , with the total number of city j's residents given by n j = I i=1 n j i . The total number of the urban system's residents is N = J j=1 n j , and fixed.
Rent for a square meter of housing of quality i in city j is q j i , and the complete list of rents in city j is q j = (q j 1 , . . . , q j I ). Qualities are numbered in ascending order: 1 refers to the lowest, while I refers to the highest, quality. Quality is measurable on a cardinal scale, with s i denoting the quality of the i-th segment. Frequently we will refer to quality 1 as simply the low quality.
A total of N/J households initially is born into each city. These households, or natives, are heterogenous with respect to a housing quality taste index θ and the moving cost m they incur when settling elsewhere. Specifically, natives to any city are distributed according to the joint c.d.f.
with 0 < θ < θ and 0 < m . F is assumed location-independent, and to exhibit strictly positive partial derivatives. Marginal distributions are denoted F (θ) and F (m), and respective marginal densities are f (θ) and f (m). Because we take θ and m to be independent,
To keep the multitude of potential moves tractable, we impose a restriction on inter city mobility popular in regional economics. Cities are arranged on a circle and then numbered consecutively from 1 to J in clockwise fashion. Households may move along this circle, but from their native city j to neighbor j + 1 only. -All households have identical preferences. Let us focus on a given city's households, thus dropping the city index for now. Household utility in segment i is
Utility depends on quality s i , on floor space h i , on the numéraire x i as well as on the taste index θ. Besides r h , r s > 0 we assume r hs > 0 > r hh .
Income w is exogenous and the same for every household. All residents are renters because all land is owned by absentee landlords. A resident opting for quality i has budget constraint 
Finally, existing housing in segment i, S i , exhibits homogeneous quality but has operating cost c that vary across units. Ordering square meters by c gives a strictly increasing function c(S i ). Inverting it, and accounting for the fact that only housing with operating cost c below rent q i will actually be offered, gives a strictly increasing housing supply function S i (q i ). This we assume to be differentiable, to exhibit ∂S i /∂q i > 0 throughout its domain, and to be the same in every city. Here rising rent expands supply only by drawing units into the market that were vacant previously. Changes in rent have no effect on construction, which is set to zero.
Suppose for the moment that for a given quality rents are equal across cities. Let these identical rents carry a bar, to distinguish them from rents that do not share their symmetry:q j i =q i for all j and i. Then for every quality indirect utilities are the same across cities, too. Moreover, within any given city households indifferent between neighboring housing qualities i and i + 1, with i, i + 1 ∈ {1, . . . , I}, are identified by setting
and solving for θ(q i ,q i+1 ), or shorter,θ i,i+1 . Letting i run from 1 to I − 1 identifies all such boundaries, i.e.,θ 1,2 ,θ 2,3 , . . . ,θ I−1,I . For notational convenience we definē θ 0,1 = θ as well asθ I,I+1 = θ . Now, V can be shown to be strictly decreasing in q and to be strictly increasing in s (Properties (ii) and (v) i,i+1 , respectively. Now, given that cities offer identical menus of utilities no household will want to move from one city to another. The number of residents in segment (i, j) thus simply becomes
Proposition 1 (Resident Sorting By Quality):

Suppose for every quality rent is the same across cities. Then residents within any given city and with taste index θ in the interval
Moreover, with the exception ofθ 0,1 andθ I,I+1 every boundary shifts with the two rents governing the segments it separates. Differentiating θ(q i , q i+1 ) with respect to q i and q i+1 , atq i andq i+1 , gives 
Hence there must certainly also be migration from segment (i, j) to (i, j +1). On the other hand, for rentsq
). In this case there must certainly also be immigration from segment (i, j − 1), and possibly even other city j − 1 segments, into (i, j). Given this asymmetry of migratory responses, the derivative of the segment population n 
The derivative's sign follows from the properties set out in (5). Its three terms have an intuitive interpretation. Consider a one Euro rise in q j i , for instance. This, first, drives housing consumers away into rivalling segment (i + 1, j), with the magnitude of household loss indicated by the first term on the r.h.s. of (6). Second, it drives housing consumers away into rivalling segment (i − 1, j), as the second term on the r.h.s. of (6). And third, it makes consumers emigrate to segment (i, j + 1), as captured by the third term on the r.h.s. of (6). -Proposition 3 sets out the two other partials of n j i , again with signs inferred from consulting (5).
Proposition 3 (Segment Population and Neighboring Segments' Rents):
The partial derivative of the number of residents of segment i in city j, n j i , with respect to the next-higher segment's rent, q j i+1 , at the initial symmetric allocation exists, and is equal to
Likewise, the partial derivative of n j i with respect to the next-lower segment's rent, q j i−1 , at the initial symmetric allocation exists, and equals
Since city j is small, rent changes induced in neighboring cities by manipulating q
will not feed back into j. Nor do they affect rents in any of the many cities elsewhere. Demand spillovers into either of the two neighboring cities j − 1 and j + 1 continue to travel along the -large -circle, either in clockwise or in counterclockwise fashion, to fade away eventually. Now, with the derivation of derivatives complete we no longer need to employ the bar notation. Derivatives' evaluation at a symmetric allocation is always implicitly understood.
Rents and Filtering in a Model of Spatial Mobility
This section analyzes local government's policies. We assume that local government may either set the price of low quality housing q j 1 . Or local government may tear down, and hence evict tenants from, low quality housing. This restricting policies to interfere with low quality housing only may itself seem restrictive. Yet from a modeling perspective, the opposite is true. Local governments are able to manipulate rents in every segment even if their policies are restricted to the low quality segment. It is obvious that local governments are able to manipulate rents in every segment if they may directly reign into that segment.
In the model below demolition is always directed against non-vacant housing. One might argue that in the current discussion demolition typically is about vacant housing. Yet as long as rents have not fully come down (the paper's case study gives one example of this) those units that are currently vacant and about to be demolished might well be units sought after if rents were lower. Put differently, our analysis really also addresses the case where demolition is targeted to units that are vacant yet might be consumed at lower rent. Now let −z j 1 > 0 be the number of tenants evicted from low quality housing about to be demolished. For the sake of simple notation we suggest that local government picks housing units inhabited by immobile (e.g., older) tenants. Then z
also is the number of those who apply for housing in segment (j, 2). Moreover, dz 
Variable
Magnitude and Sign Household equivalents of . . . 
This system of I − 1 equations jointly determines the I − 1 rents observed on competitive housing markets. We assume that an equilibrium exists. Moroover, we also assume that this equilibrium specifies the same rents in every city j = 1, . . . , J.
Next, differentiating (9) with respect to policy parameter α j ∈ {q j 1 , z j 2 }, inserting derivatives (6), (7) and (8), and rearranging gives the following set of I −1 equations Essentially, the first line of (10) 
in its first row and zero elsewhere. This shock is strictly negative. Equipped with this notation, (10) can more compactly be written as A j y j = b j . Proposition 4 explores the properties of this solution.
Proposition 4 (Dominos)
Rents in segments i = 2, . . . , I exhibit the following derivatives: In essence, Proposition 4 parallels Sweeney (1974a)'s Lemma 7. Sweeney's lemma applies to a more broadly defined set of preferences; while Proposition 4 also admits housing supply's endogenous adjustment, households' endogenous lot size as well as inter city migration. The underlying idea seems very intuitive. Much as in a sequence of dominos, both policies' bolstering of (reducing) demand for the secondlowest quality ultimately pushes up (pulls down) rent in every higher quality. An equally viable metaphor may be that of low quality housing serving as a "pillar" or "corner stone" to housing in qualities towering above it. Should low quality flats' rent give in, so would rents in every other segment.
Segment boundaries are θ(q
, and hence are composite functions of the policy variables. Let us rewrite these values as t j i,i+1 (α j ). Differentiating t j i,i+1 (α j ) with respect to α j yields the combined effect of a change in α j on the segment boundary:
for i = 1, . . . , I −1. Total derivatives can thus be calculated by inserting boundaries' partial derivatives, from (5), as well as solutions for rent changes obtained in (12).
Further, to infer boundary changes' signs we use (13) to rewrite (10) as
for i = 2, . . . , I. This simpler version of (10) explicitly relates the "inflow" of households into segment (i, j) from (i + 1, j), as the first term on the r.h.s., to the stream of households "flowing out" of (i, j) into (i − 1, j), being the first term on the l.h.s. (Inflows and outflows may either be positive or negative.) The following proposition signs boundary changes, and hence filtering flows.
Proposition 5 (Filtering):
The signs of the derivatives of segment boundaries t 
Federal Coordination
We compare isolated policies, carried out by a single city only, to coordinated policies, obtained when identical policies are pursued by all cities simultaneously. In order to distinguish between variable changes in these two scenarios, derivatives for coordinated action (isolated action) carry superscript c (superscript nc). For example, (∂q 4 i /∂z 4 2 ) nc is the change in rent in (i, 4) following demolition of low quality housing in city 4 only, while (∂q 4 i /∂z 2 ) c is the change in rent in segment (i, 4) following uniform demolition of low quality housing in all cities j = 1, . . . , J.
Rent changes under coordinated action result from retracing the previous section's discussion for when the inter city allocation of households remains intact. 
Moreover, comparing the effect of changing α under isolated action and under coordinated action on segments i = 2, . . . , I shows that
That is, (i) (Migration) Policy coordination upsets rents equally across cities.
1 On the one hand, demolition evicts dz2 households from segment 1 and subsequently induces them to move into segment 2; on the other hand, demolition induces n j f (t 
(ii) (Rents) Policy coordination reinforces the responses of higher segments' rents. (iii) (Filtering) Policy coordination dampens filtering flows.
As is familiar from the literature on fiscal federalism, coordination of local policies effectively denies mobile residents the option of leaving the city (Property (i)). Unsurprisingly, any pressure policy may generate in the low quality segment is channeled into higher segments, rather than into other cities. Thus rents increase by more than if the city had only acted on its own (Property (ii)). Intuitively, in the absence of emigration demand for higher quality housing responds less elastically to those rent increases triggered by the local policy. Upper segments' rents must rise by more if these segments are to make room for tenants filtering up. Finally, under coordination the filtering flows into higher segments become less pronounced even as rents increase more strongly (Property (iii)).
At last we turn to local governments' objectives. Let us suppose that local governments are run by landlords, and that landlords may attempt to increase total rental revenues. As Proposition 6 indicates, raising low quality rent or demolishing low quality stock when all other cities also do is more successful in propelling extra rental income than pursuing these policies on one's own. Not just do rents in higher segments increase by more (while low quality rent either rises, too, or remains constant). Also, residents' total demands for housing within each of those higher segments increase by more, too (so that the outflow out of low quality housing is smaller, too). Joint action is unambiguously better than isolated action.
Proposition 7 (Local Government Policies) Let a city either raise low quality rent or demolish low quality stock. Either policy drives up total rental income in that city by more if accompanied by simultaneous and identical policies in all other cities.
Fundamentally, a city demolishing on its own will drive away residents not just from the segment to be demolished but also from every other of its segments. Coordination remedies this. Simultaneous demolition forestalls migration across cities and within qualities, and thus strongly reinforces a landlord government's incentive to demolish. The following section briefly presents an illustration of this idea.
A Case Study
Over 1.2 million flats were vacant in Germany's East in 2001, in a total of 7.6 million units. In response, some 250,000 flats were leveled so far, and another 220,000 flats will follow in the years up to 2016 (see the introduction). Policy makers motivate this large scale demolition by arguing that, first, demolition targets low quality housing noone wants and, that second, demolition "stabilizes housing markets". As one politician argued, a ". . . clear focus on demolition has brought considerable relief to housing markets . . . " (FAZ (2006) ).
Of course, these two motivations contradict each other. If it were only unattractive housing that is torn down then overall rents certainly could not be "stabilized", as the filtering model tells us. In any case, both motivations do connect to this paper's model, both in terms of its key assumption as well as in terms of key predictions. First, politicians' self-professed objective that demolition should "stabilize housing markets" connects well with the model assumption that governments strive to increase landlords' rental incomes.
And second, politicians' claim that demolition merely targets unwanted housing has implications within the model that can be tested. If governments merely pull down truly superfluous housing only then East Germany's rents should at best stagnate, if not fall, through the demolition period. In contrast, finding that East Germany's rents in fact increases during this period would point to the opposite interpretation, of demolition in fact taking down housing units that residents would otherwise value, and inhabit. Of course, we need to control for both, individual heterogeneity as well events unfolding during demolition. This we do by (i) employing micro data and (ii) contrasting rent changes in Germany's East with those observed in Germany's West.
We make use of a very large micro data set of East and West German households (2010), we specify the following difference-indifference (DID) model
where is the household number, x is a vector of attributes characterizing the location and quality of that household's flat, β is the vector of these attributes' coefficients and γ 0 , γ 1 and δ 0 and δ 1 are the intercept and dummy variable coefficients, respectively.
Roughly, δ 0 gives rent growth for a West German flat while δ 0 + δ 1 gives rent growth in Germany's East. Hence δ 1 , as the difference between these two differences, has the interpretation of being the excess of the East German rent change over and above the rent change observed for Germany's West. Put differently, δ 1 captures the extent to which rents in East Germany grow by more than do rents in Germany's West, for a flat of identical attributes. It is only this excess that we will attribute to the demolition program taking place just then.
The first column of coefficients in Table 2 documents the estimate of δ 1 as well as estimates of the two dummy variables. (Estimates of control variable coefficients are not shown, but largely are plausible.) All of the three estimates are significantly different from zero. First we see that Eastern rent roughly is 14% smaller than rent of a Western flat of comparable quality and location. This is only a small East-West rent differential, and it suggests that indeed East's demolition activities may target flats that have only ever been offered at fairly expensive rent.
Second we see that Western rents actually have fallen by 2.5% over the four years. So any given Western flat has experienced a decline in rent. In contrast, and third, we see that rent for a similar flat in East has fallen by a mere 0.003%, or not at all. Put differently, rents in East, being the treatment region, have succeeded in rising relative to rent in West, as the control region. To be sure, this is all in spite of an enormous excess supply of housing (not at all present in West) that must in principle have pushed rents the other way. We interpret this finding as refuting the claim that Eastern demolition is innocuous, dispensing with unwanted housing only.
The other two columns of coefficients in Table 2 offer yet two other variations in estimation. If we average the data by county, then we obtain a data set of 305 county averages yearly, or 610 observations. Pooling data from these years and repeating the difference-in-difference procedure set out in (20) gives the coefficient estimates in the second data column. This procedure throws away information, and while estimates still point into the same direction as before it is not surprising that the key coefficient δ 1 no longer is significant here.
However, averaging household data by county becomes meaningful again if we construct a true panel, of average county information. For each county we have average data for 2002 and 2006, and given the county identifier we can match county data for these two years. For each county we then first difference (FD) equation (20), to rule out the possibility that the presence of unobservable effects in each county biases our estimates. Given the resulting estimate δ 1 , we again find that Eastern rents grew over and above the Western trend. The estimate, 2.6% , is significant and also reassuringly similar to the estimate we found first.
Conclusions
This paper focuses on how landlord-ruled cities may best sustain, or even raise, their rental incomes in the context of multiple quality housing, and given the grown importance of vacant housing. We devise a model in which individuals make simultaneous decisions on housing quality, floor space, and residential location. A single city may wish to demolish some of the stock in its lowest quality segment on its own, without other cities going along. Yet such demolition will drive many of that city's residents out of every of its qualities, thereby diluting the incentive to demolish. Coordinating these local demolition efforts greatly enhances the incentive to demolish. The paper's focus is on demolition, yet the analysis also addresses issues pertinent to zoning. In the paper, local governments demolish low quality buildings. But much of zoning also is about reducing the supply of low quality housing. For instance, the minimum lot size restrictions that characterize much of Eastern Massachusetts's zoning effectively ration supply (Zabel/Dalton (2011) ). If demolition is the reduction of the housing stock, then zoning is that housing stock's prevention. From this perspective we expect institutions facilitating zoning's coordination to also speed up zoning's introduction.
Appendix A Lemma 1 (Indirect Utility Properties):
(i) V exhibits strictly increasing differences with respect to θ and (s, q).
Proof of Lemma 1 (Indirect Utility Properties):
(i) Consider comparing the maximum utilities that result for two distinct combinations of quality and rent (s , q ) and (s , q ), where s , s ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s I } and q , q ∈ R + . Suppose s > s and q > q . Now surely for all θ ≷ θ we have
also. This proves that
Put differently, indirect utility V exhibits strictly increasing differences with respect to θ and (s, q). Proofs of (ii) to (v) are indicated in Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Resident Sorting By Quality):
. Inserting indifference condition (3), and also spelling out the resulting pair of inequalities out for segment i − 1, translates into
Hence residents with a taste index θ in the interval [θ i−1,i , θ i,i+1 ] prefer segment i to either of i's neighbors i − 1 and i + 1.
In fact, residents in [θ i−1,i , θ i,i+1 ] prefer i to every other quality. Consider, for example, a much better segment s k , with k > i+1. Specifying the pair of inequalities in (22) 
] exhibit θ < θ k−1,k , they are more strongly attracted to segment k − 1 than to k. Applying this argument to successively lower segments until segment i + 1 is reached, shows that
. A similar argument applies to the case where k < i − 1.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Segment Population and Rent):
We divide the proof into three steps. First we derive the right derivative of n 
Now consider the ratio (n
). This ratio can be expanded as follows:
By the implicit function theorem, θ i,i+1 is a differentiable, and hence continuous, function ofq 
(ii) Consider a rentq 
clearly is more attractive than segments of comparable quality elsewhere. We decomposeň j i into natives and immigrants. The ratio of the change in natives to the change in rent can be written asn 
Next we turn to immigrants to (i, j) . Figure 1 (in the text) points to which natives from city j − 1 may be attracted to (i, j). The Figure shows maximum utility in the three segments (i − 1, j − 1), (i, j − 1) and (i + 1, j − 1), as well as maximum utility in competing segment (i, j), as functions of the taste index θ. Defině
as the pull that segment (i, j) exerts on those initially in segment (i, j − 1). On the one hand, the unknown number of those wanting to emigrate to (i, j), d E, certainly is smaller thann j−1 (F (θ
On the other hand, this number certainly is greater thann j−1 (F (θ
The first and the last term in this series of inequalities converge to the same expression asq j i approachesq j i . Hence so does the middle term, by the "squeezing rule". The derivative of the number of migrants from j − 1 to j thus is the limit of either the first or the last term in the preceding series of inequalities, and hence can be derived as:n (27) with (24) shows that the derivative atq j i exists, if the initial allocation is symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4:
(Existence) We first document an existence property not explicitly mentioned in the Proposition. Generally, the coefficients of ∂q j i /∂α j , i = 2, . . . , I, are stacked into the (i − 1)-th column of A j :
(28) where, to be sure, the first and the last column of A j look slightly different.
The effects of a one Euro change in q j i on segments i − 1, i and i + 1 are found in column (i − 1)'s three consecutive rows i − 2, i − 1, and i, respectively, whereas the column's remaining entries are zero. Now, the element in column i − 1 and row i − 1, also shown in (28), is a diagonal element of A j . In absolute value this (negative) element exceeds the sum of the two (positive) off-diagonal elements found in the column's rows i − 2 and i. This property applies to any of A j 's columns. Thus A j is diagonally dominant.
But then A j also is non-singular (Graybill (1983, Theorem 8.11.2) . Hence (A j ) −1 exists, and with it a solution to (10). This solution is unique.
(i) (Raising Low Quality Rent) Note that (A j ) −1 has non-positive entries everywhere (Takayama (1985) , Theorem 4.D.3, parts (I") and (III"), or Simon/Blume (1995) , Theorem 8.14). Thus every component of the solution vector (A j ) −1 b j is simply the product of a non-positive number, taken from the first column of (A j ) −1 , and the negative shock (11). Thus every element of the solution y j is non-negative.
Next we show that the elements of y j in fact are strictly positive. Consider ∂q 
where ∂t 2,3 /∂q 1 is given in (13) when setting α = q 1 and i = 2.
On the one hand, the l.h.s. of (29) must be non-negative. After all, ∂q 3 /∂q 1 ≥ 0, as established above, while ∂q 2 /∂q 1 = 0, by assumption. Hence ∂t 2,3 /∂q 1 ≥ 0.
On the other hand, the r.h.s. of (29) is strictly negative (see (5)). We conclude that ∂q 2 /∂q 1 > 0. Repeating this argument for successively higher quality segments reveals that ∂q i /∂q 1 > 0 for all i = 2, . . . , I.
(iii) (Demolishing low quality stock) The proof for showing that ∂q i /∂z 2 > 0 for all i = 2, . . . , I is similar to (ii).
Proof of Proposition 5 (Filtering in a Model with Spatial Mobility):
(i) We focus on the case where α = q 1 first. The I-th segment version of (14) 
Following Proposition 4, Part (i), the r.h.s. of (30) is strictly negative. Then so must be its l.h.s. Thus ∂t I−1,I /∂q 1 < 0.
Proceeding in this fashion towards successively lower qualities will show that derivatives of all boundaries (except for t 0,1 ) with respect to q 1 are strictly negative.
(ii) Now focus on the case where α = z 2 . Analysis of derivatives of boundaries with respect to z 2 is identical to the analysis in the previous paragraph for i = 3, . . . I. These derivatives are all strictly negative, too.
Treating the case of ∂t 1,2 /∂z 2 is even simpler. The i = 2 version of (13) which is strictly positive.
Proof of Proposition 6 (Federal Coordination):
(i) (Migration) (We sketch the proof only because the details of the full proof would require introducing additional notation.) To solve for rents in every segment i = 2, . . . , I in every city j = 1, . . . , J we need to set up a system of (I − 1)J equations. Differentiating this system with respect to α j = α gives a linear system of (I − 1)J equations in the (I − 1)J unknowns contained in y = (y 1 , . . . , y J ).
We collect the values found on the right hand sides of these equations in the (I − 1)J × 1-vector b = (b 1 , . . . , b J ), where b j is constant across cities. Note that b exhibits only zeros, except for on the first, and then on every (I − 1)-th, position. The system's coefficient matrix, denoted C, essentially is blockdiagonal, with the representative local coefficient matrix A j = A repeatedly used as block, for a total of J times.
The only extra novelty to be taken care of is that on the two off diagonals I − 1 entries off the main diagonal we now encounter non-zero elements that capture the effects of changes originating in the two neighboring cities' rents on a given city's housing market. (These latter effects were not present in (28).)
One can show that the resulting matrix C is diagonally dominant. Hence C is non-singular, too, (again Graybill (1983) , Theorem 8.11.2) and its inverse C −1 exists, and exhibits non-negative entries only.
The solution for y is given by Cb. This product makes use of only the first, I-th, etc. column of C. The coefficients found in these columns repeat themselves every
